And the author thinks it appropriate, with special cautiousness and specific examination to the factual or legal issues in particular cases, to extend the above principles to panels’ review under other covered agreements (other than the Anti-dumping Agreement).
In sum, panels should be cautious about the “activist” postures in the GATT/WTO context. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review.
After all, the international system and its dispute settlement procedures, in stark contrast to most national systems, depends heavily on voluntary compliance among participating members. Inappropriate panel “activism” could well alienate members, thus threatening the stability of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure itself. Moreover, panels are well advised to be aware also of the potential shortcomings of the international procedures, shortcomings that sometimes relate to a shortage of resources, especially (but not only) resources for fact finding, as well to the problems of the need for a very broad multilateral consensus. Furthermore, panels should also recognize that national governments often have legitimate reasons for decisions they take. And more generally, panels should keep in mind that a broad-based, multilateral international institution must contend with a wide variety of legal, political, and cultural values, which counsel in favor of caution toward interpreting treaty obligations that may be appropriate to one society but not to other participants.13
However, panels must understand the central role of GATT/WTO adjudicatory system plays in enhancing the implementation, effectiveness, and credibility of the elaborate sets of rules for which the WTO has been created. Successful cooperation among national authorities to a large extent rests with the institutions given the responsibility to help carry out the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Thus, when a particular national authority’s activity or decision would undermine the effectiveness of WTO rules, or would establish a practice that could trigger damaging activities by other member countries, panels will undoubtedly show less deference. 14上一页 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 下一页
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